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ARGi ' 
A. The Tax Commission's Final Decision should be reversed because it is 
arbitrary 
Herculo , /.;.-. .i.gi M - *.-,*• - * tne Final Decision's lailure to 
* • •
 :
 , ib itself sufficient grounds for reversa" ~ Tiah Code 
/-mn. y o3-46b-l0(lj(cj (requiring the agency to include a "statement CM (i^ reasons" for 
its decision), and I Jtah Code Ann. § 63-4<>b-l()(l)(h) (requiring iln ippella i i « 
"grant rehel ** *e agency anion v nhilu ,"» M nTui \ppt'll;M»t al 8. 
Hie entire I'inal Dm^inn K I ;^  i.hat two pages long, and the relevant portion of 
the Decision and Order less than a paragraph. There is no analysis whatsoever Reiving, 
in part, on First Nat'7Bank of Boston v Count) hu \>i l.qiiaiizaih.:: \ 
1990)(reversing the ' rax Commissioi• < i< •* ••* • ' <~* ..'ion oi liat Having 
no « \ uli iili.ii \ IMMI) Krirulc'i opium*1 brief urged this Court to reverse the Tax. 
( • - i - lailure to comply with its statutory duty to state the reasons for its Final 
Decision. Id. at 10. 
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In response, the Tax Commission merely restates the arbitrary language of the 
Final Decision. The supposed "statement of the reasons" is, in its entirety, that "the 
position of the Commission [is] that nitrogen gas purchased by [Hercules] for use in its 
graphite fiber manufacturing process does not constitute a gas within the meaning of the 
statute [Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994)] and is, therefore, subject to sales tax." 
Brief of Appellee at 21. This is a restatement of the Tax Commission's conclusion , and 
cannot objectively, rationally or honestly be called a "statement of the reasons," which 
Section 63-46b-10(l)(c) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") requires. 
The Tax Commission's Final Decision explains nothing. Why, for instance, is 
nitrogen gas not a "gas" within the meaning of Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994)? How 
does the Tax Commission distinguish legislative history confirming that "gas," as used in 
Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994)" or its predecessors, is not limited to "natural gas? Is the 
Tax Commission's Rule R865-19S-35 and its prior decisions, which limit the scope of 
non-taxable industrial inputs listed in Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994) to "fuels," out of 
harmony with the plain language of the statute which excludes such industrial inputs as 
"electricity" and "heat" from the tax base even though they are not fuels? Why does the 
Final Decision never even mention Hercules' arguments, much less rebut them? Is it 
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because the Tax Commission cannot rebut Hercules' arguments, so, instead, it ignores 
them and simply issues a Final Decision without "a statement of the reasons" to justify it. 
Precisely because the Tax Commission failed to comply with the UAPA in stating 
the reasons for its Final Decision, Hercules was obliged to guess what the Tax 
Commission's reasons might be, and address all the arguments the Tax Commission's 
Auditing Division raised below. The arbitrariness of the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision is all the more apparent given the Commission's post-hoc rationalizations that 
comprise the major portion of its brief. The UAPA's requirement that an agency advise 
litigants of the reasons for its action in a final decision is presumably meant to foreclose 
the agency from issuing arbitrary and biased decisions. If agencies can issue orders 
without stating the underlying reasons for them, without fear of having such arbitrary 
orders reversed, the UAPA's requirement of fairness becomes toothless rhetoric. Nor is 
the UAPA's requirement to include a "statement of the reasons" in an agency order 
satisfied when a taxpayer learns of the putative reasons for a ruling against it^br the first 
time in an appellate brief "the Attorney General writes months later. 
In attempting to distinguish First Natl Bank of Boston in its brief, the Tax 
Commission argues the Final Decision was based "squarely on [stipulated] facts." Brief 
of Appellee at 21. That is true, but totally irrelevant. Hercules cited First Natl Bank of 
^ < n n 7 1 3 
Boston for the proposition that Tax Commission decisions cannot be a "creation of fiat." 
The parties' stipulation of facts does not excuse the Tax Commission's failure to provide 
a "statement of the reasons" in its Final Decision. The Tax Commission's Final Decision 
must be reversed because the Commission's failure to explain the reasons for its order 
violates the UAPA's requirements of fair dealing with taxpayers. 
B. The Tax Commission's Final Decision should be reversed because it 
disregards applicable rules of statutory construction. 
Hercules opening brief argued that the words of Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994) 
should be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)("in matters of statutory 
construction, the best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in 
enacting an Act is the plain language of the Act.)" By application of this rule, nitrogen 
gas qualifies as one of the non-taxable inputs in the industrial process under Section 59-
12-103(l)(c)(1994) because it is indisputably a "gas." To avoid this sensible application 
of the "plain language" rule of statutory construction, the Tax Commission offers three 
excuses. 
First, the Commission quotes its own previous decision holding that "gas means 
natural gas." Brief of Appellee at 10. That prior administrative decision was never 
reviewed for its correctness. This argument is a meaningless tautology. The argument 
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proves nothing and compounds the arbitrariness. This is akin to arguing the Tax 
Commission is correct simply because it says so. Without any "statement of the reasons" 
for an order, as in this case, an appellate court has nothing upon which to decide whether 
the Tax Commission's Final Decision is correct or incorrect. Citing a Tax Commission 
precedent to the Tax Commission may carry some weight before the Tax Commission, 
but has none before this Court. The standard of review in cases like this, in which the 
only issues are legal, is that the appellate court "shall grant the commission no deference 
concerning its conclusions of law, applying a correction of error standard. . ." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b). Consequently, the Tax Commission's ruling that "nitrogen gas" 
is not "gas" is neither binding nor relevant to this Court's review. Section 59-1-610(2) 
instructs Utah appellate courts to "give no deference" to the Tax Commission's 
conclusions of law. 
Second, the Tax Commission invokes the doctrine ofnoscitur a sociis ("known for 
its associates") and the related rule of ejusdem generis ("of the same kind") to conclude 
that the "plain and ordinary meaning of the word 'gas' is combustible natural gas when 
considered in relation to the other forms of fuel and energy listed in the statute." Brief of 
Appellee at 11. This argument not only fails to follow the rules of statutory construction 
upon which it claims to rely, it is a sleight-of-hand at odds with the Tax Commission's 
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own administrative rule to the contrary. As noted in Hercules' opening brief, the 
common feature to the list of non taxable purchases in Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994), 
especially evident in light of the statute's legislative history, is not that each are fuels 
since two of the commodities (electricity and heat) are indisputably not fuels. R. at 
000241, Tr. at 16. Instead, the common feature is that they are industrial inputs into the 
manufacturing process. This latter reading of the Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994) is 
consistent with the rules of statutory construction the Tax Commission cites, but does not 
follow; and is inconsistent with the Commission's argument that "the drafters [of Section 
59-12-103(l)(c)] were intending that subsection (c) apply to natural gas or gases which 
were fuels." R. at 000077, Division Memorandum at 8. Obviously, such an argument 
cannot be correct because non fuels like "electricity" and "heat" would be taxable 
notwithstanding Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994)'s express exclusion of these inputs from 
the tax base. 
Implicitly recognizing these logical inconsistencies, the Tax Commission cs brief 
for the first time in the course of proceedings to date attempts to justify the Final Decision 
by arguing that the common feature of the list of non taxable purchases in Section 59-12-
103(l)(c)(1994) is that they are fuel or energy inputs. Brief of Appellee at 14. This is 
another post-hoc rationalization and is completely disingenuous. The Tax Commission's 
359307.1 6 
own Rule R865-19S-35 plainly limits coverage of Section 59-12-102(7) to "fuels used in 
a combustion process." The Tax Commission's arguments implicitly concede Rule 
R865-19S-35 is out of harmony with its governing statute. To save what otherwise would 
be an obvious losing position, the Tax Commission must add language the legislature did 
not to obtain its desired result. The Tax Commission's appellate brief introduces a new, 
never before asserted, statutory interpretation of Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994), which is 
that the statute covers energy inputs, not just fuels. To make such a dramatic change 
now, on appeal, is totally improper. Instead, the Tax Commission would have to 
promulgate another rule. See Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46a-3(3)("Rulemaking is also required when an agency issues a written interpretation 
of a state or federal legal mandate.") Moreover, in order to apply this new rule in this 
case, the Commission would have to delete the words "used in the combustion process" 
as found in the old rule since the parties here stipulated that injection of nitrogen gas is 
"used in the combustion process." In sum, the Tax Commission's arguments are result-
oriented, non sequiturs, advanced to sustain taxation, no matter the inconsistencies. 
Third, the Tax Commission manufactures ambiguity in Section 59-12-
103(l)(c)(1994), when there is none, then ignores the parties' stipulation to argue that 
nitrogen gas may not qualify as gas under dictionary definitions. Brief of Appellee at 12. 
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Citing V-IOil Co. v. Dep't of Environmental Quality, 904 P.2d 214 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), 
the Tax Commission argues that the word "gas" has multiple meanings, like the meaning 
of "in use" at issue in V-I Oil By analogy to V-I Oil, the Tax Commission argues 
dictionary definitions of "gas" are unhelpful in deciding what "gas" means in Section 59-
12-103(l)(c) and should, therefore, be discarded. Id. 
Again, the Tax Commission's arguments are non sequiturs. The issue for this 
Court to determine is not the meaning of "gas" as used throughout the Utah Code. It is 
the meaning of "gas" as used in Section 59-12-103(l)(a)(1994). This Court's 
interpretation of "gas" in Section 59-12-103(l)(a)(1994) necessarily overrides any 
inconsistency in Rule R865-19S-35 since rules out of harmony with their governing 
statutes are void. Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div., Utah State Tax Comm yny 846 P.2d 
1304 (Utah 1993). 
Hercules' opening brief demonstrated that the Utah Legislature is perfectly capable 
of using the words "natural gas" when it means "natural gas" and "gas" when it means 
"gas." In fact, the Utah Code has at least fifty-two references to the words "natural gas." 
Brief of Appellant at 14. This was true even in 1943 where the identical language at issue 
in this case first appeared in the Utah Revised Statutes. The 1943 code incorporated 
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definitions first used in the 1933 Utah Revised Statutes. In turn, the 1933 code expressly 
made a distinction between "gas" and "natural gas/' demonstrating: 
(1) the legislature has always been capable of distinguishing "gas" from 
"natural gas" when it wanted; 
(2) "gas" when used in the Section 59-12-103(l)(c) and its predecessor-statutes 
means "gas," including nitrogen gas, used as an industrial input; and 
(3) the Tax Commission has attempted to rewrite Section 59-12-103(l)(c) as if 
it, rather than the legislature, had written it. Brief of Appellee at 21. 
Equally important, the Tax Commission's arguments, which attempt to muddy the 
issue by offering multiple definitions of "gas," repudiates the parties' stipulation. The 
parties' stipulation repeatedly uses the word "nitrogen" as an adjective to modify the 
noun "gas." Having stipulated that nitrogen is a gas, the Tax Commission cs brief argues 
that any one of five dictionary definitions of "gas" means the word is "too general a term 
for a dictionary definition to be helpful" in deciding what "gas" means in Section 59-12-
103(l)(c)(1994). Brief of Appellee at 13. When dissected logically, this argument is 
plain silly. The first dictionary definition of the word "gas" as quoted in the Tax 
Commission's brief ("a fluid that has neither independent shape nor volume . . .") 
excludes "natural gas," which the Tax Commission argues is the one and only meaning of 
the word "gas" in Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994). That definition cannot, therefore, be 
correct. The second definition quoted in the Tax Commission's brief ("a gas or gaseous 
mixture") includes natural gas but also nitrogen gas. This definition is not only helpful, it 
is dispositive because the third definition ("empty talk") excludes both nitrogen gas and 
natural gas, as does the fourth definition ("gasoline") and the fifth definition (one having 
"unusual appeal" as someone "skinny-dipping with kindred souls"). Brief of Appellee at 
13. Only the first and second definitions can rationally be deemed inputs into the 
industrial process, and only the second includes natural gas, which everyone agrees is a 
non taxable input in the manufacturing process. 
Therefore, the only definition which fits the term "natural gas" also includes 
"nitrogen gas." The Tax Commission rejects these dictionary definitions of "gas" not 
because there are "too many to be helpful," but because a logical analysis of them does 
not give the Tax Commission the result it wants - taxation of an industrial input the 
legislature said was not taxable. By the Tax Commission's distorted logic, those who are 
"skinny-dipping with kindred souls" stand on equal footing with Hercules in claming its 
purchases of nitrogen gas are non taxable under Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994). 
Hercules' argument (that purchases of nitrogen gas for industrial use are not 
taxable) is consistent with the underlying policy of sales and use tax law, which is that the 
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tax is not imposed on certain inputs to production of tangible personal property, but on 
the last user or final consumer of a product. B. J. Titan Services v. State Tax Comm yn, 842 
P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), Brief of Appellant at 11. In response, The Tax Commission 
claims BJ. Titan stands for no such proposition, that Utah tax policy is limited to an 
exemption for ingredient or component parts for which purchases of nitrogen gas does not 
qualify. Brief of Appellee at 15. 
These arguments are easily rebutted. The Utah Supreme Court in BJ. Titan states 
"Manufacturers [like Hercules] are not deemed consumers of tangible personal property 
[upon whom the tax is imposed} which is transformed into final products." Id at 826 
(emphasis added). Ingredients or component parts are obvious inputs in manufacturing a 
product exempt from taxation. Id, "An exception" to the general rule that inputs are not 
taxed exists "for property and equipment used in the manufacturing process." Id. 
However, not all property used in the manufacturing process, such as coal or gas, is 
subject to taxation. 
From these examples, it is evident the underlying tax policy, is to avoid taxation of 
many inputs to manufacturing, such as ingredients or component parts and industrial 
inputs because (1) those are integrated with the saleable product taxed on retail sale; 
and/or (2) the final user or consumer is not the manufacturer. 
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In this case, Hercules does not claim nitrogen gas is a component part of its 
saleable product. It does claim, however, that Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994) includes a 
similar concept which the Utah Supreme Court explained in BJ. Titan. The Legislature 
chose not to tax certain consumables or industrial inputs. Their cost is reflected in the 
final product sold and taxed when purchased by the end user. The words "other fuels" in 
Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994) cannot possibly be a limitation on all the other industrial 
inputs listed in that section that are not taxable because some industrial inputs are clearly 
not fuels. The words "other fuels" must then be a "catch-all" or residual. The concept is 
that itemized industrial inputs used in the combustion process, like natural gas and 
nitrogen gas, are not taxable. 
C. The Tax Commission's Final Decision should be reversed because it 
incorrectly ruled that Section 59-12-103(l)(c) is an exemption statute 
rather than a taxing statute. 
In its opening brief, Hercules argued that the Tax Commission's reliance on 
Decision 94-2080 is misplaced because the decision includes a number of plain errors. 
The Tax Commission mistakenly believed that the issue before it was whether the 
taxpayer's purchases of nitrogen were "tax exempt." R. at 000084, Decision 94-2080 at 2 
and 3. This is wrong because Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994) is not an exemption statute 
to be interpreted narrowly against the taxpayer; it is a tax imposition statute to be 
interpreted liberally against the taxing authority so as to avoid the imposition of taxes by 
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implication. See, e.g., Hales Sand & Gravel v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax 
Comm n, 842 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 1992). Brief of Appellant at 17. 
The Tax Commission's response to this argument is to claim that it is "unfair." 
Brief of Appellee at 16. The Tax Commission does not explain why it is unfair. Whether 
Hercules' argument is or is not "unfair/' it is certainly accurate. The Tax Commission 
itself and not Hercules characterized the issue in Decision 94-2080 as whether the 
taxpayer's purchases of nitrogen were "tax exempt." R. at 00084, Decision 94-2080 at 2 
and 3. Again without thought or analysis, the Auditing Division repeated this mistake, 
claming that Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994) is an "exemption provision." R. at 00078, 
Division Memorandum at 9. The Tax Commission's mischaracterization of Section 59-
12-103(l)(c)(1994) as an "exemption statute" is wrong. Only when caught on this 
mistake, which has significant adverse consequences to the taxpayer, does the Tax 
Commission claim Hercules' arguments are "unfair." By this reasoning there can never 
be appellate review of an agency decision because, by definition, the burden on appellants 
is to demonstrate the agency decision is in error. 
Implicitly conceding that Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994) is not an exemption 
statute, but a taxing statute, the Tax Commission next attempts to prop up its case by 
claiming that the sale of nitrogen gas can be taxed as tangible personal property. Brief of 
Appellee at 17. Once again, the Tax Commission offers no supporting argument for this 
conclusion. Ignoring Hercules' arguments to the contrary, the Tax Commission merely 
says it "has been unable to identify any authorities addressing the proper statutory 
construction of a statute which operates both to impose a tax on the purchase of an item 
for some uses and exempt the purchase of the same item for other uses." Id. at 17. There 
are two flaws in this attempted rebuttal. 
First, the Tax Commission simply assumes, without analysis or proof, that nitrogen 
gas is taxable as tangible personal property. This is logically impossible for reasons 
Hercules explained in its opening brief. In summary, Hercules un-rebutted argument is 
that Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994) cannot be a restatement of the general proposition 
that purchases of tangible personal property are taxable because "heat," which is taxable 
only if sold for commercial purposes, is not tangible personal property. If the Legislature 
had intended its tax on tangible personal property in Section 59-12-103(l)(a) (1994) 
subsumed transactions in Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994) (the Tax Commission's 
argument), the latter section would have been unnecessary and its enactment superfluous. 
Brief of Appellant at 24. 
Second, the issue in this case cannot possibly be how to construe a statute that is 
both a tax imposition statute and a tax exemption statute, as the Tax Commission claims. 
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Brief of Appellee at 17. Prior to 1996, Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994) was a tax 
imposition statute. In 1996, the Legislature chose to replace the term "gas" with "natural 
gas" in Section 59-12-103(l)(c), and, for the first time, codify an exemption statute for 
purchases of "natural gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels for industrial use." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(42)(2000). There can never be a simultaneous imposition 
and exemption statute, as the Tax Commission now asserts, because the exemption 
statute, being enacted later, would control to the extent of any conflict. 
The Tax Commission then launches into a discussion of the legislative history of 
Section 59-12-103(l)(c), making two points, but otherwise ignoring Hercules' opening 
brief. The Tax Commission claims that Hercules has misrepresented Union Pacific 
Railroad v. State Tax Comm'n, 426 P.2d 231 (Utah 1967) and Ogden Union Ry. and 
Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 399 P.2d 145 (Utah 1965) by claiming the statutes there 
at issue had "identical language to Section 59-12-103(l)(c)(1994)." Brief of Appellee at 
18. This is a peripheral point, but one easily disproved by quoting the language from 
these cases. The statute at issue in Ogden Union Ry. was Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-
4(1953), which provided that "The sale of coal, fuel oil and other fuels shall not be 
subject to the tax except as hereinafter provided." The Court continued to explain "But 
the 'except as hereinafter provided' is that the tax specifically applies to: ' . . . gas, 
electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or furnished for domestic or commercial 
consumption." Ogden Union, 399 P.2d at 146. The above-italicized words are identical 
to the language in the statute at issue in this proceeding. The statute at issue in Union 
Pacific was the same statute. The effect of these prior statutes was to remove certain 
industrial inputs from the tax base. 
Finally the Tax Commission claims that Hercules' recitation of the legislative 
history of Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994) gave it an "expanded definition." Brief of 
Appellee at 18. Again that is easily disproved by quoting the language itself of 
predecessor statutes to Section 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994). In 1937, when the Legislature 
imposed a sales tax on the purchase of "gas, electricity, or heat, furnished for domestic or 
commercial consumption," it expressly referenced and incorporated the definitions of 
"gas" under the "public utilities" provision of the 1933 Utah Revised Statutes. In turn, 
the 1993 Utah Revised Statutes expressly included "natural or manufactured" gas within 
the definition of "gas" corporation," thus making it clear that "natural gas" was not the 
only meaning of "gas" to be applied in the sales tax statute. See Brief of Appellant at 21. 
The Tax Commission's only rebuttal to this argument is to quote Representative 
John Valentine, who in 1996 (when the statute at issue was changed from a tax imposition 
statute to an exemption statute) said that "it is an attempt to codify the existing status 
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quo." Brief of Appellee at 19. That is precisely correct because the then existing status 
quo (taxation of "gas" inputs except "natural gas") was unlawful and had no basis in law. 
To remedy that anomaly, the statute was amended so that the purchase of "natural gas" 
used as an input in the industrial process is exempt from taxation. Section 59-12-
103(l)(c) (1994) (the old statute) and Section 59-12-104(42). Since the latter provision is 
a subsequent enactment it would control purchases of "natural gas" after 1996, but not 
before. 
CONCLUSION 
Hercules' purchases of nitrogen gas during the audit period are not taxable because 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(c) (1994) excludes purchases of gas used for industrial 
inputs from the statutorily enumerated list of taxable transactions. The Tax 
Commission's Final Decision should therefore be reversed. 
DATED this IS day of September, 2000. 
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